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6.1  Introduction 
Personal saving has traditionally accounted for more than half of  all 
real net private saving in the United States. Incentives that increase the 
personal saving rate therefore have a potentially significant effect of  the 
total rate of  capital formation.’ The purpose of  the current paper is to 
present some new microeconomic evidence that is relevant to evaluating 
alternative  changes in  the personal  tax  treatment of  savings  and of 
interest and dividends. 
There are, of  course, many factors in addition to the personal tax rules 
that contribute to the low rate of  saving in the United States, including 
consumer credit rules, the social security system, the taxation of  business 
income, and the tax treatment of  personal interest expenses. Our focus 
on the personal tax treatment of  savings and the income from savings 
should not be misinterpreted as an indication that we believe that per- 
sonal tax rules alone are responsible for the low United States saving 
rates. We do believe,  however, that changes in these tax rules are a 
potentially useful way of  increasing saving. 
There has nevertheless long been resistance among both economists 
and government officials to changing the tax rules to encourage saving.2 
Martin Feldstein  is professor of  economics, Harvard  University  (on leave).  He was 
formerly president of  the National Bureau of  Economic Research and is currently chair- 
man, Council of  Economic Advisers.  Daniel R. Feenberg is a research associate at the 
National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
The  views  expressed  here  are  the  authors’  and  should  not  be  attributed  to  any 
organization. 
1. Total capital formation also depends on government saving and international capital 
flows. Government saving has always been small and, in the majority of  years since 1950, 
has been negative. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) show that United States net international 
capital flows have averaged less than 1% of  saving and, for the OECD as a whole, are not 
responsive to domestic differences in saving rates. 
2.  Some would  say to “reduce the  features that discourage  saving.’’ The difference 
depends on whether one takes “income”  or “expenditure” as the appropriate object of 
taxation.  We need not comment on this issue in the current paper. 174  Martin Feldstein/Daniel R. Feenberg 
The opposition to encouraging saving has in part been a vestige of  the 
Keynesian fear that a higher rate of saving might only increase unemploy- 
ment. Whatever the relevance of this concern in earlier decades, oversav- 
ing is no longer regarded as a potential problem. A further source of 
opposition to modifying the tax rules to encourage saving has been a 
concern that any such change would thwart the egalitarian thrust of tax 
policy. This in turn reflected a belief  that the incentive effects of  tax 
changes would be negligible, implying that tax policy could encourage 
saving only by redistributing disposable income from lower income tax- 
payers with low marginal propensities to save to higher income taxpayers 
with high marginal propensities to save. 
In contrast, there is now strong professional and political interest in tax 
changes that could encourage personal saving3 This reflects in part a 
reassessment of  the earlier studies that had concluded that saving is not 
sensitive to the rate of return and therefore also not sensitive to the tax 
treatment of that return. Because those studies used nominal rather than 
real interest rates, the interest rate coefficient was biased in a way that 
made  it  appear to be  insignificant or even to have  the reverse  sign 
(Feldstein 1970). New studies that relate saving to an estimate of the real 
net rate of return have suggested that savings do respond positively to this 
more appropriate measure of  the return (Boskin 1978). Unfortunately, 
the problems of measuring the relevant real expected return are such that 
the econometric evidence is never likely to be compelling. It is important 
therefore that the general theory of  consumer behavior implies directly 
that a compensated increase in the real net rate of  return necessarily 
induces individuals to postpone consumption. The effect on saving of  a 
change in the taxation of capital income therefore depends on the timing 
of tax payments and on the response of government spending4  If govern- 
ment spending in each year remains unchanged, national savings must 
rise. If  the compensating changes in the tax keep tax liabilities in each 
year unchanged, private saving must also increase.’ 
Tax changes that reduce the difference between the pretax and posttax 
returns on capital may be worthwhile even if  the saving rate does not 
respond positively to the net rate of return. A gap between the pretax and 
posttax rates of  return implies a loss of  welfare no matter what  the 
uncompensated savings response. Of  course, since the revenue lost by 
reducing the tax on saving could alternatively be used to reduce some 
other distorting tax, the desirability of  reducing the tax on saving is not 
unambiguous. Nevertheless, recent investigations in the theory of  opti- 
3.  See, for example, chapter 13 of  the present volume as well as Becker and Fullerton 
(1980), Boskin (1978), Bradford (1980a), Feldstein (1977, 1978a), Fullerton et al. (1979), 
King (1980), McLure (1980), Summers (1978), and von Furstenburg  (1980). 
4. This sentence and the following two sentences are explained in Feldstein (19786). 
5. The proposed changes in the tax treatment of  saving are compensated changes if  not 
reducing the tax on saving would imply that some other tax would be reduced. 175  Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
ma1 taxation do not suggest that the tax rate on the income from savings 
should probably be lower, and perhaps very much lower, than the tax rate 
on labor income.6 If  the marginal rate of  substitution between current 
consumption and future consumption is independent of the quantities of 
leisure consumed, the optimal tax rate on the income from savings is zero 
(Mirrlees 1976). Substantial  departures from this separability assumption 
still leave it optimal to  tax capital income less than labor income. Indeed, 
if subsidizing retirement consumption reduces the distorting effect of the 
labor income tax on preretirement work effort, it may be optimal to “tax” 
the income from saving at a negative rate, i.e. to subsidize it. Explicit 
calculations of  a simple model using empirically plausible but conserva- 
tive parameter values (i.e. assuming that the compensated supply re- 
sponses of  both labor and saving are zero) imply that there may be a 
substantial potential welfare gain associated with reducing the tax on 
capital income and making up the lost revenue by an increase in the tax on 
labor income (Feldstein 1978~;  see also Green and Sheshinski 1978 and 
Summers 1980). More generally, the potential gain from reducing the tax 
on capital income depends on the extent of the existing wedge between 
pretax and net-of-tax rates of  return. It is significant therefore that in 
recent years personal, business, and property taxes have taken more than 
two-thirds  of  the  real  pretax  return  on capital used  by  nonfinancial 
corporations (Feldstein and Poterba 1980). 
Although economists have generally been concerned with reducing 
this source of  welfare loss, the public and congressional discussion has 
focused on increasing aggregate saving. Moreover, the recent proposals 
to encourage saving emphasize the incentive effects of a higher net rate of 
return and not a redistribution of  disposable income from lower income 
to higher income groups. Indeed, a principal reason for using personal 
tax changes in addition to changes in business tax rules is to permit a 
targeting of the tax reduction benefits on middle income taxpayers rather 
than on all taxpayers in proportion to their existing wealth. 
A  further  reason  for directly encouraging  an increase  in  personal 
saving is to reduce the inflationary pressures that might otherwise accom- 
pany a tax-induced increase in the demand for investment. Although the 
total rate of  capital accumulation is constrained by  the rate of  saving, 
capital accumulation can be increased without altering the personal tax 
rules if the corporate tax rules are changed to increase the rate of return 
after the corporate income tax. This in turn raises the net return to savers 
and encourages increased  saving. If  the savings response were  rapid 
enough, the economy would shift to a higher rate of investment with no 
increase in the rate of  inflation. In practice, however, the corporate tax 
changes would probably raise investment demand more rapidly than the 
6. We  use  the  expressions “tax on saving” and “tax  on the income from  saving” 
interchangeably. 176  Martin Feldstein/Daniel R. Feenberg 
supply  of  savings.  The  result  would  be  an  increase  in  inflationary 
pressure.’  Direct tax incentives to save can prevent these inflationary 
pressures by causing the increase in saving to occur at the same time as the 
increase in investment demand. 
Two dynamic aspects of  saving are particularly important. First, be- 
cause saving represents an adjustment of  the stock of wealth, a relatively 
small change in the desired level of  wealth can induce a relatively large 
increase in the rate of  saving. Second, because the desired level of wealth 
depends on the expectedfuture net rates of  return, an anticipated reduc- 
tion in the future rate of  tax on investment can induce a rise in current 
saving. Thus there can be an increase in saving without any concurrent 
government deficit  .8 
There is surprisingly little econometric evidence about individual sav- 
ing behavior and the likely magnitude of response to alternative tax rules. 
In particular, there is no evidence that deals explicitly with such things as 
the anticipated rate of  return, the effect of  the tax rate per se, or the 
impact of  nonlinear rules like the maximum levels of deductible savings 
for the current Individual Retirement Accounts. Although we cannot fill 
these gaps in the current paper, we believe that we can provide some 
useful information  on the current distribution  of  saving, wealth,  and 
investment income in relation to tax rates and total income. This evi- 
dence can be used to evaluate the potential impact and revenue cost of 
alternative tax rules in a way that is just not possible without detailed 
microeconomic evidence. In particular, we focus on the conflict between 
the desire to limit the deductions or exclusions of the individual filer (in 
order to reduce the total revenue loss and to focus the benefits on middle 
income taxpayers) and the  possibility that such limits would eliminate any 
marginal incentive for most taxpayers. 
Our analysis uses two bodies of  microeconomic data. The principal 
data source is the Treasury’s public use sample of  individual tax returns. 
We use a stratified random sample of  26,643 individual tax returns for 
1972 (a one-in-four random  sample of  the full public use  sample) in 
conjunction with the NBER TAXSIM mode1,’which computes tax liabil- 
ities and tax rates based on the tax law as of  1972 and the alternative 
modifications.  This data set provides  detailed information on current 
interest and dividends, labor income, and total taxable income for each 
individual. A special advantage of  the 1972 data is that the exact age of 
7.  The inflationary pressure could of  course be checked by a tighter monetary policy, 
allowing the money rate of interest to rise relative to the Wicksellian natural rate of interest 
during the transition. But such exclusive reliance on monetary policy in the transition is not 
without substantial real costs in our economy with many long-term fixed interest contracts. 
8. These ideas about the timing of  tax changes are discussed briefly in Feldstein (1980) 
and developed more fully in chapter 13 of  the present volume. 
9.  The economists who have participated in the development of  TAXSIM are Daniel 
Feenberg, Martin Feldstein, Daniel Frisch, Larry Lindsey, and Harvey Rosen. 177  Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
each taxpayer is included (based on IRS examination of Social Security 
Administration records for each individual). Our second body of  data is 
the 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statis- 
tics.  Although  the  sample  of  7,795  observations  is  inferior  to the 
TAXSIM data in a number of  ways,'O  it has the unique advantage of 
containing information on  individual financial saving. Since the TAXSIM 
sample used in this paper is also for 1972, results obtained with the two 
data sets are generally comparable. 
Although  a great many specific proposals to encourage saving have 
been made, all of them have in common the purpose of increasing the net 
rate of  return on saving or, equivalently, of  increasing the amount of 
future consumption that can be obtained per dollar of current consump- 
tion that is foregone. The proposals that are particularly concerned with 
saving and that form the focus of  our analysis can usefully be divided into 
two types: (1) those that allow the taxpayers to exclude some amount of 
saving from taxable income and (2) those that allow the taxpayer to 
exclude  some  amount of  interest  and  dividend income  from  taxable 
income. " Before examining the specific saving proposals, we comment 
briefly on some more general tax proposals that also might encourage 
saving. 
The most general of  these proposals is to replace the income tax with a 
tax on consumer spending.I2  In comparison to the income tax, a consump- 
tion tax in effect allows a deduction for  all saving. A more modest partial 
move in the direction of  a consumption tax would be to adopt a value- 
added tax to replace part of  the current tax structure. This again would be 
like the deduction method because income that is saved would avoid the 
value-added tax. 
Several general proposals that would reduce the effective tax rate on 
interest and dividends have also been actively discussed. Some form of 
integration of the corporate and personal taxes (presumably by  giving 
individuals a credit for corporate taxes in proportion  to dividends re- 
ceived)  would  raise the net rate of  return on equity investment and 
10. The Consumer Expenditure Survey contains fewer observations on high income 
families, is aggregated into family units rather than taxpayer units, and does not contain a 
precise measure of  taxable income. 
11. These two methods can be equivalent in the sense that they define the same lifetime 
budget constraint for an individual and therefore induce the same consumption choices. 
This equivalence is violated to the extent that these are bequests or that the individual's 
marginal tax rate varies over time. Moreover, in practice these proposals would differ for a 
very long transition period because different cohorts of  taxpayers are affected differently; 
e.g. the benefits of  deducting saving have little effect on those who are already retired while 
an interest and dividend exclusion does; more generally, on the nonequivalence  in the 
transition  generation of  consumption  taxes (that allow a savings deduction)  and labor 
income taxes (that exclude capital income) see Feldstein (19786). 
12. This proposal has a long and venerable pedigree that is discussed in Kaldor (1955) 
and Musgrave (1959). See also Bradford (19806), Feldstein (1976), Fisher (1937), Kay and 
King (1978), the Meade Committee (1978), and the United States Treasury (1977). 178  Martin Feldstein  /Daniel R. Feenberg 
therefore encourage equity finance as well as increased saving. The same 
would be true of  a proposal to permit individuals to exclude a limited 
amount of  dividends that are reinvested in new issue corporate stock. 
Adjusting the measurement of  interest income to exclude some or all of 
the effect of inflation on interest rates would encourage the use of debt as 
well as increased saving. The proposals to reduce the maximum marginal 
tax rate to 50% or to tax “personal services income” and “investment 
income” on two separate schedules would raise the net return on all 
forms of  capital. 
Although these general proposals might be useful in encouraging sav- 
ing, we shall not explore them further in the paper, in order to concen- 
trate on the simpler and more direct deduction and exclusion proposals. 
Section 6.2 examines the deduction approach and considers the conse- 
quences of  such a change in both the short-run transition and the longer 
run. The next section then analyzes the short- and long-run consequences 
of interest and dividend exclusion proposals. There is a brief concluding 
section. 
6.2  Deductions for Saving 
Under existing law, an individual who is not a participant in an em- 
ployer-sponsored pension plan13 can establish an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) and contribute up to 10% of his wage and salary, with a 
limit of  $1,500 per year. These contributions are deductible from total 
income in calculating taxable income, and the earnings on the assets in 
the IRA are not subject to tax. A penalty is imposed if  the funds are 
withdrawn from the IRA before the individual reaches age fifty-nine. 
Withdrawals after that age are taxable as ordinary employment income. 
The IRA is thus similar to a consumption tax with respect to the eligible 
amount of  saving.  I4 
The saving incentive provided by the IRA could be increased in three 
ways: (1) by  raising the percentage and/or dollar ceilings on contribu- 
tions; (2) by extending the IRA option to everyone with wage and salary 
income and not just to those who  are not already participating  in  a 
pension plan; and (3) by increasing the liquidity of the IRA accounts by 
permitting withdrawals after as little as (say) four years. To the extent 
that IRA participants are effectively constrained by  either the 10% or 
$1,500 limits, the IRA does not provide any marginal incentive to save 
more. In the present paper we compare some of the implications of  10% 
13. A “participant” in such a pension plan need not have or be accruing any vested 
benefits. 
14. Individuals with self-employment income are eligible for a similar program. Anyone 
can contribute up to 15% of  self-employment income to a Keogh Plan, with a maximum of 
$7,500. The contribution is deductible, and the income of the plan is untaxed. Withdrawals 
are taxed as ordinary employment income. 179  Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
and 15% limits with ceilings of  $2,000 and $3,000. Because higher limits 
increase the revenue cost of these plans, we also consider a combination 
of  a higher ceiling and partial deductibility, e.g. allowing an individual to 
contribute 15% of  earnings up to $3,000 but  deduct only half of  this 
amount. Such partial deduction plans increase the range of  marginal 
effectiveness although, for previously intramarginal contributions, they 
reduce the incentive as well as the cost. (Because the 1972 tax return data 
do not separate the earnings of  husbands and wives, all of the proposals 
are defined in terms of  the taxpaying unit rather than the individual.) 
The current rule that limits eligibility for an IRA to those who do not 
participate in employer pension plans eliminates approximately 50% of 
all employees.  Moreover, those employees without pension coverage 
tend to be those who are least likely to save and least likely to be affected 
by tax considerations; they have low incomes and are frequently quite 
young.I6 The current eligibility limit thus eliminates substantially more 
than 50% of  those who would be encouraged by saving deductibility if  it 
were generally available. The current paper examines a savings deduc- 
tion  plan  in which  all individuals with  wage  and salary  income  may 
participate. 
Finally, the restriction that funds must remain in the IRA until the 
individual reaches age fifty-nine (or be subject to a special withdrawal tax 
and other penalties) substantially reduces the liquidity of  the IRA sav- 
ings. For many individuals, this reduction in liquidity may outweigh the 
higher net-of-tax return that the IRA offers. An individual at age forty 
may be unwilling to commit funds for nineteen years even in exchange for 
a higher rate of  return. This illiquidity could be eliminated by allowing 
individuals to choose at the end of  a short period like four years between 
withdrawing the funds in the account (and paying tax on the amount) or 
“rolling over” the funds for another four-year period. In practice, indi- 
viduals who are reluctant to commit funds for a very long period may 
decide sequentially to leave the funds in the IRA  account rather than pay 
the  tax on the withdrawal. Although we have no way to examine this issue 
with the existing data, this possibility for making IRA accounts more 
attractive should be borne in mind when considering the likely responses 
to extending the IRA option to all individuals. 
If  the savings deduction is judged as an incentive to a higher rate of 
saving,@  there are three potential problems. First, during a transition 
15. On the extent of  private pension coverage, see President’s Commission on Private 
16. The number of  IRA plans indicates that only about 5% of those who are eligible have 
17. The Canadian government introduced such a plan in 1972. 
18.  As opposed to judging it in terms of  removing the tax wedge between the pretax and 
posttax rates of returns or of switching the tax base to avoid what some regard as an unjust 
double taxation of  income that is saved. 
Pensions (1980). 
actually established an IRA; see Lubick (1980), p. 14. 180  Martin Feldstein/Daniel R. Feenberg 
period  after the tax law is changed, individuals can reduce  their tax 
liability without any increase in saving by transferring previously accumu- 
lated assets into the special account. Under an IRA-type  plan with a 10% 
limit, an individual with assets equal to one year’s earnings could obtain 
the maximum savings deduction for a decade without doing any addi- 
tional  saving.  Indeed, for such  an  individual,  the tax  change would 
provide no marginal incentive to save while the tax reduction for previous 
saving would increase disposable income and therefore  presumably cause 
an increase in consumer spending.I9  The extent to which this is a problem 
depends on the amount of  financial assets (relative to earnings)  that 
individuals have available and on their willingness to sacrifice the liquid- 
ity of  those assets by committing them to an IRA.” We shall examine in 
detail the amount of  financial assets that individuals have and the poten- 
tial revenue effect if  these assets were transferred to a special savings 
account during a transition period after the introduction of  a savings 
deduction rule. 
The second potential problem with a savings deduction plan is that, 
even  after  the transition  period  in  which  individuals merely  transfer 
preexisting assets into a special savings account, there would be some 
individuals for whom  a savings deduction with dollar and percentage 
limits would provide either no marginal incentive or a marginal incentive 
that is small relative to the intramarginal tax reduction. Thus an indi- 
vidual earning $10,000 and saving $900 might increase his saving by $100 
to the $1,000 maximum allowed by a 10% ceiling but would receive a tax 
reduction on the entire $1,000 amount. With even a 20% marginal tax 
rate, the tax cost would be double the induced saving. We shall investi- 
gate the potential importance of  the problem by examining the current 
distribution of  savings relative to wage and salary income and the poten- 
tial savings and revenue effects if individuals respond in different ways to 
the change in tax rules. 
The third problem is that individuals may not be very responsive to the 
change in the net rate of  return implied by the savings deduction. Because 
we are uncertain about the likely response, we shall present results for 
several different behavioral assumptions. At one extreme, we assume no 
behavioral response. At the other, we assume that all individuals take 
maximum advantage of  the potential deduction. We also investigate a 
19. This would, of course, be offset by a reduction in other consumer spending caused by 
the increase (or lack of  decrease) in some other tax. 
20.  Individuals might in principle borrow and use the borrowed funds to finance their 
IRA contributions,  thus earning tax-free interest in the IRA and paying tax-deductible 
interest on the borrowed funds. We ignore the possibility of  borrowing on the assumption 
that most  individuals have little  opportunity to  borrow without collateral and  that  the 
expanded IRA (like the existing IRA and Keogh) could not legally be accepted as collateral 
for a loan. Individuals might borrow by enlarging their house mortgage, but this would be 
discouraged by the need to hold most of the proceeds of such borrowing for several years 
before it could be contributed to  the IRA. 181  Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
response described in terms of  the elasticity of current consumption with 
respect to the marginal rate of  transformation between current and future 
consumption. 
Before  looking  at  the specific  results,  four  notes  of  caution  are 
appropriate. First, our analysis is only a partial equilibrium  one. We 
assume that interest rates and other factor incomes remain unchanged. 
Second, the only behavioral response that we consider is saving. Since a 
higher net rate of  return improves the trade-off between current work 
and future consumption,  some  individuals  may  respond  by  working 
more. Their saving would increase even if  their saving rate remained 
unchanged.  Of  course, for some individuals the income effect would 
dominate and work  effort would  be decreased.*]  We ignore any such 
change in work effort  and labor income. Third, we do not adopt an 
explicit life-cycle framework for our analysis. This implies that we do not 
take age explicitly into account in calculating the response to tax rules2* 
and that we do  not deal separately with the increased saving of  the savings 
cohorts and their subsequent increased dissaving. Analyzing the complex 
dynamics of  explicit  intertemporal optimization  would  require  much 
better data than currently exist. Moreover, there is no agreement on the 
extent to which individual saving does correspond to such rational life- 
cycle optimization. Finally, we consider only limited tax consequences; in 
particular, we ignore the effects of  increased accumulation on corporate 
tax revenue. 
6.2.1  Asset Transfers during Transition 
We begin our analysis by examining the extent to which individuals 
could respond to an expanded IRA  program by transferring preexisting 
assets into the special savings accounts. The data we present show that 
this is a relatively unimportant problem except perhaps for those with 
relatively high incomes. 
Table 6.1 presents the cumulative distribution of gross financial assets 
in each income class based on the 1972 Tax Model. Although the tax 
returns do  not report financial assets as such, the gross financial assets can 
be estimated from the reported interest and dividends. For this purpose, 
we have used a uniform dividend yield of  3% for all taxpayers and a 
uniform interest rate of  4.5% .23 It may be useful to bear in mind that in 
1972 per capita disposable personal income was $3,837 and by 1980  it had 
21. If the change in the saving rule is a compensated change, the income effect could be 
ignored. Of  course, the alternative tax change might also affect current work  and thus 
current saving. 
22.  In some calculations, however, we assume that taxpayers over the age of sixty-five 
are not eligible to participate. 
23. The 1972 mean dividend price ratio for the Standard and Poor’s corporate index of 
500 stocks was 2.84%. The maximum interest rate that could be paid on time deposits was 
4.5%. 182  Martin Feldstein/Daniel R. Feenberg 




AGI Class (X $1,000) 
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69  38  16  6  55 
79  54  27  10  66 
83  63  34  13  72 
89  75  47  20  80 
93  84  62  28  87 
96  91  74  39  92 
98  96  85  54  95 
Source:  1972 Tax Model. 
Note:  Dividend and interest are capitalized at .03 and ,045, respectively. Individuals over 
age sixty-five are excluded. 
somewhat more than doubled (in current prices) to $8,010. The popula- 
tion to which this tabulation refers includes all families and unrelated 
individuals, except those headed by  someone aged sixty-five or older. 
Note that  among those with  incomes under $10,000 (approximately 
$20,000 at 1980 levels), 79% had less than or equal to $1,000 of  gross 
financial assets. Only 11% had as much as $5,000. 
Since our concern is with the extent to which individuals could use 
existing financial assets to  contribute to an IRA-type  plan without doing 
any new saving, we have also restated these estimates of  gross financial 
assets in terms of the number of years that they could be used to fund the 
maximum IRA-type  contribution for which the individual is eligible. For 
example, with  an allowable  IRA-type  contribution  equal to 10% of 
income with a maximum of $2,000, an individual earning $15,000 with 
$7,000 of gross financial assets would have enough to finance somewhat 
more than four years of maximum IRA contributions. Table 6.2 shows 
the cumulative distribution of  “potential years” for taxpayers grouped by 
income class based on IRAs  equal to  the lesser of  $2,000 and 10% of wage 
and salary income. These data exclude taxpayers over age sixty-five and 
apply the IRA rule to taxpaying  units rather than separately to each 
individual. Note that in the class with adjusted gross incomes (AGIs) of 
less than $10,000, 79% did not have enough financial assets to finance 
even a single year’s maximum IRA  contribution. Since this under $10,000 
group contained 60% of  all taxpayers below age sixty-five, it is clear that 
for the great majority of taxpayers there is little problem of  a substantial 
revenue loss while these individuals finance IRA-type  contributions out 
of  previously accumulated assets. Even in the higher income group with 
1972 AGIs of  $10,000 to $20,000, 60% lacked even one year’s worth of 
IRA contributions at the maximum allowable rate. Only about 15% of 
taxpayers  with AGIs  below $10,000 and 20% with AGIs  between $10,000 183  Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
Table 6.2  Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Years 
of Transferable Assets 
Years of 
Trans-  AGI Class (x  $1,000) 
ferable 



















































































































Source:  1972 Tax Model 
Note: Cumulative percentage of  taxpayers without the indicated number of  years’ worth of 
financial assets to finance an IRA equal to 10% of  wages, with a ceiling of  $2,000, solely 
from those assets. Individuals over age sixty-five are excluded. Dividends and interest are 
capitalized at .03 and .045, respectively. 
and $20,000 had enough financial assets to finance as much as  five years of 
contributions. 
Table 6.3 presents the aggregate implications of  this potential asset 
transfer for a savings deduction plan that allows contributions of  10% of 
income with a $2,000 annual maximum. The table shows that the max- 
imum contribution that individuals could legally deduct totaled $56.1 
billion, or slightly more than $800 per taxpayer. By contrast, the max- 
imum amount that could be financed by transfer from existing assets in 
the first year was only $26.9 billion. It should be emphasized that this 
maximum transfer would occur only if all taxpayers were prepared to lose 
the liquidity of these assets in order to  obtain the higher net-of-tax return. 
(Note that because of  the $2,000 ceiling approximately four-fifths of this 
deduction accrues to those with incomes below $20,000 and nearly all of it 
to those with incomes below $30,000.) 
The  distribution of assets in tables 6.1 and 6.2 implies that this first-year 
transfer would exhaust much of  the available assets of  most taxpayers. 184  Martin FeldsteidDaniel R. Feenberg 
Table 6.3  Aggregate Effects of Alternative Savings Deduction Plans 
Contributions from 
Maximum  Assets ($ billions) 
AGI Class  Millions of  Contribution 
(x $1,000)  Returns  ($ billions)  Year 1  Year 3 
0-10  42.2  17.9  5.1  3.1 
10-20  22.2  28.6  14.4  8.1 
20-30  4.1  7.2  5.2  3.6 
30 +  1.6  2.4  2.1  1.9 
All  70.0  56.1  26.9  16.8 
Source:  1972 Tax Model. 
Note:  Potential reductions in taxable income with the introduction of a universal IRA. The 
maximum deduction is 10% of  wages with a ceiling of  $2,000. Individuals over age sixty-five 
are excluded. 
The final column of  table 6.3 confirms the importance of  this by tabulat- 
ing the amount of  preexisting assets that could be transferred in the third 
year of such a new tax rule. The total amount of  transferable assets is 
reduced from $32 billion to only $17 billion, or less than one-third of  the 
maximum potential contribution in that year. 
In interpreting the revenue losses associated with asset transfers, it is 
important to bear in mind that they represent a one-time fixed cost of 
transition to a new system. The true economic cost of  this revenue loss is 
not the revenue loss itself but the much smaller excess burden that would 
be incurred in making up this lost revenue or that otherwise could have 
been avoided if  the lost revenue had instead been used to reduce some 
other distorting tax. The corresponding gain is the present value of  the 
perpetual reduction in the excess burden caused by the incorrect mix of 
taxes on capital and labor incomes. Because this is a comparison of  a 
one-time cost with a perpetual gain in a growing economy, the one-time 
transition cost is likely to be relatively small. 
6.2.2  Marginal and Intramarginal Saving after the Transition 
After the transition period, an individual can have a tax deduction only 
for net saving that actually adds to individual wealth and the national 
capital  Of  course, some of  this saving would have been done 
anyway. Moreover, for those individuals who would in any case have 
saved more than the maximum deductible amount, the deductible saving 
would be intramarginal and the tax rule would influence saving only by an 
income effect.  For such individuals,  since some of  the tax reduction 
would be spent, the net effect would be an increase in consumption. But 
for those individuals  who  would  otherwise have  saved less than the 
24.  Unless the individual borrows to finance these contributions. See footnote 20 for the 
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deductible amount, the new rule would provide a marginal incentive to 
save. If, however, the saving would have been close to the limit, the 
increased saving may be constrained to be less than the tax reduction. 
To shed some light on this issue, we have examined the distribution of 
existing saving rates relative to wage and salary income. For this purpose, 
we use the 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey and define saving as the 
“change in nominal net financial assets, excluding the appreciation of 
portfolio assets.” We use this definition of  saving (rather than say the 
change in net worth) because it defines the kind of  saving for which the 
tax deduction would be allowed. We then use this information to calcu- 
late the amount of intramarginal saving and other preexisting saving for 
which taxpayers would receive deductions and compare this to the poten- 
tial increases in saving that might be induced under different assumptions 
about the behavioral response of  taxpayers. The effects on tax revenue 
are also calculated. 
Table 6.4 presents the cumulative distributions of  the ratio of  net 
financial saving to wage and salary income for four income classes as well 
as for households as a whole. It is clear that a 10% limit on deductible 
saving would  be  a binding constraint for only a small fraction of  all 
households. Among those with income below $10,000, only 14% saved 
10% of  their income in the form of  financial asset accumulation. The 
fraction is essentially the same for those with incomes between $10,000 
Table 6.4  Cumulative Distribution of the Ratio of Changes 
in Net Financial Assets to Wage and Salary Income 
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and $20,000. Among those with incomes over $20,000, the $2,000 limit on 
saving deductibility becomes the constraint instead of the 10% limit. This 
implies that deductibility would be inframarginal for a larger fraction of 
these taxpayers. But the figures for the $20,000 to $30,000 class imply that 
only about one in five would otherwise be at or above the deductibility 
limit. 
Another striking feature of  table 6.4 is the very high fraction of house- 
holds who report no change in their gross financial assets. Some 24% of 
all households indicate some reduction in financial assets during the year, 
and an additional 37% indicate neither saving nor dissaving. Only 39% 
report positive saving. A tax rule allowing deductibility of  saving would 
provide an unambiguous incentive to save more to the 60% with zero or 
negative saving since there would be no offsetting income effect associ- 
ated with preexisting saving (Feldstein and Tsiang 1968). 
We have prepared simulations to compare the effects on saving and tax 
revenue of four alternative savings deductions and several different possi- 
ble behavioral responses. The two basic savings deductions are 10% of 
earnings with a $2,000 limit and 1.5% of  earnings with a $3,000 limit. A 
more restricted alternative that reduces the revenue loss without chang- 
ing the set of  taxpayers for whom the deduction provides a marginal 
incentive would limit the tax deduction to only half of  the contribution to 
the saving plan; i.e. a taxpayer with earnings of $15,000 could contribute 
up to $1,500  but  would  receive  a  tax  deduction  for only $750.  The 
earnings on all the assets in the fund would, however, be untaxed. The 
final option presented in this table is designed to  offset the  fact that higher 
income taxpayers already save a larger fraction of  their income than low 
income taxpayers. For taxpayers with incomes over $10,000, it restricts 
the deduction to the excess over a “floor” equal to 5% of the earnings 
over $10,000. For example, a taxpayer with earnings of  $20,000 could 
only deduct savings contributions in excess of  $500. Such a taxpayer could 
contribute an additional $2,000 but would receive a deduction only of 
$2,000 for the $2,500 contribution. This would have no adverse incentive 
effect on anyone who would save at least 5%  under existing tax rules. 
Moreover, even the initial 5%  has some incentive effect associated with it 
since the income on all the assets in the fund is untaxed. Indeed, for some 
high income taxpayers for whom the $2,000 ceiling is a binding limit, the 
ability to contribute an additional 5% of nondeductible earnings may be 
an incentive to 
For each of  the four alternative plans, we have calculated the increase 
in  savings and decrease in tax revenue implied  by several alternative 
behavioral response assumptions. The first assumption, that there is no 
change in saving, provides a reference standard for comparing the tax 
25. Individuals might, of  course, seek to circumvent the floor by bunching their saving 
into alternate years, but this would be worth doing only if  the ceiling were not binding. 187  Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
revenue implications of alternative behavioral responses. At  the opposite 
extreme would be the assumption that taxpayers increase their saving to 
the maximum amount of  the allowed deduction. It seems very unlikely, 
however, that individuals who currently do no saving would suddenly 
switch  to this  maximum  amount. We  have therefore examined  two 
alternatives that are much more conservative. The first assumption is that 
only those who currently have positive saving would switch to the max- 
imum, with  no change in the behavior of  nonsavers.  The alternative 
assumption is that taxpayers with positive assets would take the max- 
imum deduction while those with no assets would not respond at all. A 
fourth assumption is an arbitrary intermediate response: each taxpayer 
who has positive saving increases his saving halfway from his actual 1972 
level to the maximum amount. For example, a taxpayer with $15,000 of 
earnings and $500 of  preexisting annual savings would, with the 10% 
plan, increase his saving to $1,000. 
The other three behavioral response calculations reflect the assump- 
tion that consumer spending responds to the income and substitution 
effects of  a deduction rule with constant partial price and income elastici- 
ties. The basic concept in this calculation is the relative “price” of current 
consumption  in  terms of  foregone  future consumption.  Consider  an 
individual who decides between spending a dollar now or saving it and 
spending the principal and accumulated interest at the end of  T years.2b 
Let the nominal  interest  rate be  i, the inflation  rate be T,  and the 
individual’s marginal tax rate be 6. Under current law, the individual 
chooses between spending one dollar now and spending (1 + (1 -  6)i)= 
dollars  in  year  T. The  real  value  of  that  Tth  year  spending  is 
(1 + (1 -  6)i)=/(l + T)~,  or, ignoring terms that are of  second  order, 
(1 + (1 -  6)i -  T)=.  We shall call this rate of  transformation Ro. If  the 
individual could instead deduct the dollar of  saving, by foregoing one 
dollar of  current consumption he could add 1/(1 -  0) dollars to  his current 
savings. If  the saving accumulates untaxed, this grows to (1 + i)=/(l -  6) 
dollars at the end of  T years. The individual pays tax on this nominal 
value, although presumably at a lower tax rate (6’ <  0) because he is then 
retired. The net of  tax accumulation is thus (1 -  6‘)(l + i)=/(1 -  0). In 
real terms this is (again ignoring second-order terms) 
R1  = (1 -  0‘)(l +  i -  ~)=/(1  -  6).” 
Note that if  6’ = 6, the combination of deductibility and the nontaxa- 
tion  of  the interest on the savings account is equivalent to having no 
26.  In reality, there would not be single year but a probabilistic interval with probabili- 
ties that reflected survival probabilities. 
27  If only a fraction A of  the contribution is deductible but the subsequent tax is limited 
to  the  same  fraction  of  withdrawals,  the  rate  of  transformation  becomes 
R, =  (1 -  AO’)(l  +  i -  ~)~/(1  -  AO);  with a binding level of  deductibility, the plan has no 
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deduction and then allowing the savings to accumulate completely un- 
taxed (i.e. with no tax when funds are disbursed from the account). This 
is equivalent to consumption tax treatment and removes the distortion in 
the individual’s choice between early and late consumption. However, 
the distortion between leisure and consumption (both present and future) 
remains  and presumably  biases  the individual’s  decision  in  favor  of 
leisure. At  the alternative extreme, in which withdrawals from the fund at 
retirement are untaxed  (0‘ = 0), the individual chooses between one 
dollar of  current consumption and (1 +  i -  T)=/(  1 -  0) dollars of  con- 
sumption in year T.  This represents a more favorable trade-off between 
current and future consumption than a consumption tax and thus distorts 
consumption in favor of  the retirement years. But because it permits the 
individual to transform a dollar of pretax earnings into retirement con- 
sumption  at the real  rate of  interest, such treatment offsets the bias 
against working that is inherent in the consumption tax. Indeed, with 
0 = 0 this method is equivalent to no tax at all as far as the trade-off 
between current leisure and future consumption is concerned. 
For the purpose of  the simulations, we approximate the change in 
consumption as the sum of  a price effect and an income effect: 
ac  ac  dC= -  dR t-  dY , 
dR  dY 
where C is consumption, R is the price of  current consumption (in terms 
of  foregone future consumption),  and  Y is disposable income. From 
equation (2.1) it directly follows that 
dC -  R dC dR  Y aC dY  +--- 
c  caR R  cay~ 
dR  dY 
=aK-+(Y 
R  y-T’ 
where aR  and ciy are the price and income elasticities. We shall assume 
that these partial price and income elasticities are locally constant. 
We use this approximation to calculate the level of consumption under 
the deduction rule (C,)  as a function of the initial consumption level (C,), 
the two related price values (R1  and Ro),  and the income effect of  the tax 
change (dY).  For simplicity, we shall describe this in the case where the 
individual initially has a positive level of saving (So >  0) but in which the 
deduction limit is never binding (i.e. both So and the level of saving under 
the deduction rule, S1,  are less than the limit, L).  In this case, the relative 
price increase caused by the deduction rule is dRIR = (R, -  Ro)/Ro.  The 
income effect depends on the change in income caused by the deduction 
rule at the initial level of  saving. Recall that under current tax law the 
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deduction rule, this same level of future consumption can be bought at 
the lower current cost, RoSo/Rl.  The difference between these two is the 
increase  in  income  at  the  initial  consumption  pattern.  Thus 
dY = So -  SoRo/R1  = So(R, -  Ro)/Rl.  Substituting these expressions into 
equation (2.2) we obtain 
It is clear that equation (2.3)  is only an approximate measure of  the 
change in  consumption. We use the linear approximation of  equation 
(2.1) and evaluate  it at the initial values of  Ro  and So. We define consump- 
tion to include all uses of income other than financial saving and taxes; in 
particular, we include mortgage repayments in consumption. Moreover, 
we look only at a single year in isolation. In a full life-cycle model, the 
price effects would be more complex, the income change would reflect 
the discounted value of  the price changes in future years as well, and the 
initial level of  income (Yo)  would be replaced by a discounted value of 
future incomes.  (Note, however,  that  if  the individual’s  saving  rate 
remained relatively constant over a number of  years, the use of  So/Yo 
instead of  a ratio of two discounted values would not change the result 
appreciably.) 
The magnitudes  of  the income  and substitution effects  determine 
whether the switch to a deduction rule raises or  lowers consumption. The 
effect on saving can then be calculated from the change in consumption 
and the change in tax revenue: 
(2.4)  (Sl -  So) + (Cl -  Co) + (TI -  To) = 0 , 
where To  is the individual’s tax liability under current tax law and Tl  is the 
tax liability under the deduction rule. For an individual whose final level 
of  saving is below the deduction  limit,  Tl -  To  = -  BS,;  i.e. the indi- 
vidual’s tax liability is reduced by the product of his marginal tax rate (0) 
and his savings deduction (S,).  Note that equation (2.4)  implies that even 
if  the income and substitution effects on consumption balance so that 
consumption remains unchanged (C, -  Co = 0), saving will increase if 
the tax liability falls (S, -  So>O if  T1 -  To<O). Of  course, the income 
effect could dominate the price incentive and cause consumption to rise 
by enough to leave savings lower. To evaluate this in the current case, we 
need values of  aR  and ay  and the microeconomic distributions of  tax 
rates, savings, and incomes. 
Before discussing the values of aR  and ay,  we may comment briefly on 
three special cases, where saving is negative, zero, or above the limit. If 
initial saving is negative (So<O),  there is neither an income effect nor a 
price effect. Both consumption and saving remain unchanged. With zero 
initial saving, there is a price effect but no income effect; consumption 190  Martin FeldsteidDaniel R. Feenberg 
falls and saving rises. For an individual whose initial saving exceeds the 
deduction limit (So >  L),  there is no price effect (since R1  = Ro)  and an 
income effect given by L(R1  -  Ro)/R1;  consumption rises and saving may 
rise or  fall. Finally, for an individual whose initial level of saving is below 
the ceiling (So< L)  but for whom equations (2.3) and (2.4) imply that S1 
exceeds the ceiling, we take saving to  be either the limit or, if it is greater, 
the value of  saving implied by the income effect alone. 
In all of our simulations, we assume a unit elasticity of consumption 
with respect to disposable income: ay  = 1. Since we lack reliable econo- 
metric evidence on aR,  we perform simulations for a range of values. At 
one extreme is the case of  aR  = 0, i.e. no substitution effect.  In this 
implausible limiting  case, the only response to the tax change is the 
income effect and therefore an increase in consumption. More generally, 
aR  <  0 and the response of  consumption depends on the relative strength 
of  substitution and income effects. Since intuition about consumer be- 
havior is in terms of  the uncompensated price elasticity rather than the 
pure price effect, we derive simulation values of  aR  from assumptions 
about the uncompensated response of consumption for a “representive” 
taxpayer with disposable income of  Yo  = $10,000, savings of  So = $200, 
and a marginal tax rate of 8 = 0.25. To calculate the values of Ro  and R,, 
let  i = 0.10 be the nominal  interest  rate and r = 0.08 be the rate of 
inflation. Assume that the time to  retirement consumption is T = 15  years 
and that in retirement the individual’s marginal tax rate will be half what 
it  is  now:  8’ = 0.508. Then  Ro = (1 + (1 -  8)i -  T)~  = (1 + 0.075 
-  0.08)15 = 0.93 and R, = (1 -  8)(l +  i -  ~)~/(1  -  8) = 0.875  (l.02)15/ 
0.75 = 1.57. Thus RI/Ro  = 1.69. 
Consider first the case in which a change in the net rate of return has no 
effect on consumption, i.e. C1 = C,.  Equation (2.3) then implies that 
or, with ay  = 1, 
These specific assumptions for our representative  taxpayer then imply 
aR  = -  0.0118.  Note that although  this value  of  aR implies that the 
income  and substitution  effects  balance  and  leave  consumption  un- 
changed for the “representative” taxpayer, someone with a lower initial 
saving rate will have a smaller income effect and will therefore be induced 
by  the deduction rule  to reduce consumption while  someone with  a 
higher initial saving rate will be induced to increase consumption. 
We also present simulations based on the assumption that an increase 
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consumption to decrease, i.e. that the substitution effect outweighs the 
income effect. More specifically, we approximate the consumption re- 
sponse of  this type of  “representative” taxpayer to deductibility as a 2% 
decrease in consumption. Equation (2.3) then implies2* 
1.57 -  0.93 + 0.02(1.57 -  0.93) 
-  0.02 = (YR 
0.93  1.57  (2.7)  7 
or (YR  = -  0.041. 
The relation between these responses of  a “representative” individual 
and the aggregate responses that we obtain in the simulations reflects the 
distribution of initial saving rates and price changes and the effects of the 
deductibility ceilings. We should again emphasize that these calculations 
are not precise estimates but are approximations for a broad range of 
parameter values. A more complete analysis would instead derive each 
individual’s consumption  response with the help of  an explicit utility 
function in a life-cycle context. Realistic life-cycle calculations would 
have to take into account bequests and inheritances as well as family 
structure, private pension benefits, social security, etc. Liquidity consid- 
erations and the possible favorable misunderstanding of the deductibility 
should also be considered. At this time, there is just not enough informa- 
tion to perform such a calculation. 
In the simulations we calculate two different measures of the effect of 
the deduction on tax revenue. The first of these is the short-run effect that 
results from the immediate deduction of  the savings deposited in the 
special account. This is approximately equal to the product of  the indi- 
vidual’s marginal tax rate and the lesser of savings (S,) and the ceiling on 
the savings deduction. In fact, we use the Tax Model to calculate more 
precisely the effect of  the savings deduction in  a way  that takes into 
account the nonlinearity of the tax schedule and other features of the tax 
law. Of course, for taxpayers with negative savings, there is no change in 
tax revenue. 
Because withdrawal of funds from the savings account requires paying 
tax, the initial  deduction is  in  part  only a postponement  of  the tax 
liability. Indeed, if  the tax rate in retirement is equal to the tax rate when 
working (0’ =  O), the initial deduction is fully offset by  the subsequent 
withdrawal tax. The advantage of the deduction account is then only that 
the income on the assets accrues without tax. More generally, the long- 
run reduction in tax revenue reflects both the lower tax rate when funds 
are withdrawn  (0’<8) and the exclusion from taxable income of  the 
interest and dividend income on the amount of  saving that would have 
28.  Recall that for the representative taxpayer the real net rate of return rises from 
-  0.005 to 0.020;  including the deductibility effect implies that the current opportunity cost 
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been done under the old law (since the income on the induced saving 
would not otherwise exist). 
We calculate the long-run revenue loss by  noting first that the initial 
level of saving So grows under current law to RoSo  before it is consumed 
while  with  the  deductions it  grows  to R,So. The entire difference, 
(Rl -  Ro)So,  is the accumulated value of the lower taxes that the govern- 
ment collects on So and on the resulting interest and dividend income. 
The present value of  that difference as of  the initial date, discounting at 
the real pretax rate of  returns, is (R, -  Ro)SO/(l  + i -  IT)'.  This is the 
present value of  the revenue loss associated  with  the initial level of 
saving. The additional saving causes an additional revenue loss to the 
extent that the tax rate in retirement (0') is less than the tax rate at the 
time that the deduction is taken. If  S1 is less than the deduction limit, the 
initial  revenue loss on the induced  saving is  O(S1 -  So). The induced 
saving grows over time to (S, -  So)(  1 + i -  IT)'  and yields a tax revenue 
of  8'(S1 -  So)(l + i -  ~)~/(1  + i -  IT)'  = B'(S1 -  So).  The net revenue 
loss on the induced saving is thus (0 - 0')(S, - So). The full long-run 
reduction in revenue (associated with the single year's saving) thus has a 
present value of  (R, - Ro)So/(l  + i -  IT)'  + (0 - O')(Sl - So).  The 
simulations modify this formula  in the appropriate way in the cases where 
initial saving is negative or where the limit on deductibility is binding and 
use the full tax simulation calculations instead of  just the marginal tax 
rate.2q 
Table 6.5 summarizes the results of these simulations. Consider first 
the effects of  the alternative plans on tax revenue if  taxpayers do not 
adjust their saving at all. A savings deduction limited by 10% of wages 
and $2,000 would have an immediate revenue cost of  $49. The present 
value of the full long-run tax effect is slightly larger, $60, implying that the 
exclusion of the interest and dividends outweighs the recouping of part of 
the initial deduction. Increasing the limits by 50% (to 15% of wages and 
$3,000) increases the initial cost by proportionally less but increases the 
long-run deduction by almost 50%. This indicates that the primary value 
to taxpayers of  the higher limits is in the implied interest and dividend 
exclusion. Finally, note that, while cutting the deduction in half obviously 
halves the short-run revenue loss, the long-run revenue effect is much 
less. 
Consider now the effects of the alternative saving responses to the 10% 
deduction limit. If  taxpayers who already do some saving increase their 
saving to  take full advantage of the deductions, average saving would rise 
by $158. The deduction of  this saving would increase the revenue loss by 
$36, from $49 to $85. The present value of  the long-run revenue loss 
would also rise, but by proportionately less since the increase reflects the 
29.  This measure of  revenue loss does not reflect the extra corporate tax revenue that 
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Short  Long 
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Savings unchanged 
Savings increase to 
maximum if 
saving > 0 
Savings increase to 
maximum if 
assets > 0 
Savings increase 
halfway to maximum 







(aR=  -0.041) 
(aR=  .0118) 
(aR= 0) 
0  49  60  0  61  86 
158  85  78 
129  79  75 
79  67  69 
58  47  57 
10  37  51 
157  69  68 
Partial Deduction: 
One-Half of  15% 
Deduction, $3,000 Limit 
Change In 
Tax Revenue 
Short  Long 
Saving  Run  Run 
0  31  67 
298  125  118  289  64  83 
240  116  114  240  61  82 
144  94  102  144  94  99 
57  54  82  28  29  66 
5  43  77  -8  25  64 
168  79  94  111  39  71 
Deduction with Floor: 
10% Deduction, 
$2,000 Limit, 




Short  Long 
Saving  Run  Run 
0  37  24 
97  57  34 
79  53  32 
48  47  29 
26  32  22 
10  30  21 
68  40  26 
Source:  Simulations based on 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
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differences  between the initial deduction and the present value of  the 
extra revenue obtained when the funds are withdrawn. The correspond- 
ing figures when the response is limited to  those who initially had positive 
assets or when the size of  the response is halved are similar although 
obviously somewhat smaller. 
The partial price elasticity associated with unchanged consumption for 
the representative taxpayer (aR  = -  0.0118) causes saving to rise by an 
average of $58 per taxpayer. The immediate revenue loss associated with 
this is $47, and the long-run revenue loss is $57. Thus, in this case, the 
increased personal saving exceeds the immediate reduction in personal 
tax revenue and is approximately equal to the long-run tax reduction. If 
the incentive to postpone consumption does cause a fall in consumption, 
the increase in saving exceeds the short-run  and long-run loss of  tax 
revenue. 
Since all of  these figures are means per taxpayer and there were 70 
million  taxpayers  in  1972, these estimates imply  that the immediate 
revenue cost of  a 10% deduction plan is a minimum of  $3.5 billion (at 
1972 levels) with no saving response. Beyond that, each dollar of induced 
saving reduces revenue by only about 20 cents. With consumption un- 
changed, the revenue loss is $3.5 billion and the increased saving is $4 
billion. With consumption reduced by 2%, the revenue loss is somewhat 
less than $5 billion and the saving increase is about $10 billion. 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 analyze the effects of a savings deduction by income 
class. Table 6.6 accepts the conservative assumption of  unchanged con- 
sumer spending and examines the impact on saving and taxes of  alterna- 
tive deduction plans. It is clear that the basic deduction of  10% of wages 
with a $2,000 limit induces proportionately more response at each higher 
level of  income. Note that switching from a lo%, $2,000 limit to a 15%, 
$3,000 limit has virtually no effect except in the highest income group. 
Table 6.7 focuses just on the lo%, $2,000 deduction limit but examines 
the responses in each income class associated with  different  types of 
behavior.  One point worth noting is that the effect of  different price 
elasticities on the amount of  saving is proportionately greater for low 
income taxpayers than for high income taxpayers. Note also that, regard- 
less of the price elasticity, there is little tax reduction below $10,000 and 
that  above $10,000 the tax  reduction  rises  at least  in  proportion to 
income. 
6.3  Exclusion of Interest and Dividends 
Until  1980, an individual  taxpayer  could  exclude  the first $100  of 
dividend income from AGI  and therefore from taxable income. A couple 
could exclude twice that amount. The law was modified in 1980 to double 
these exclusions and to extend them from dividends to both dividends Table 6.6  Distributional Implications of Alternative Savings Deduction 
with No Change in Consumption: Mean Changes in Saving and Taxes 
Deduction with Floor: 
10% Deduction, 
Partial Deduction:  $2,000 Limit, 
$2,000 Limit  $3,000 Limit  Deduction, $3,000 Limit  over $10,000 
Change in  Change in  Change in  Change in 
10% Deduction,  15% Deduction,  One-Half of  15%  Floor of  5% of  Income 
Tax Revenue  Tax Revenue  Tax Revenue  Tax Revenue 
Income Class  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long  Short  Long 
( x  S1,OOO)  Saving  Run  Run  Saving  Run  Run  Saving  Run  Run  Saving  Run  Run 
@lo  13  9  9  11  10  15  6  5  12  12  9  9 
10-20  60  53  70  58  61  96  28  33  79  26  38  35 
20-30  166  143  168  146  160  273  67  88  22 1  69  88  38 
30 +  444  310  329  52 1  387  427  282  193  291  172  175  16 
All  58  47  57  57  54  82  28  29  66  26  32  22 
Source:  Simulations based on 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
Note:  All figures are means and are expressed in 1972 dollars. Table 6.7  Distributional Aspects of  Alternative Behavioral Responses to a 10% Savings Deduction:  Mean Changes in Saving and Taxes 
Change in Saving by 
Income Class ( x  $1,000) 
Short-Term Change in Taxes by 
Income Class ( x  $1,000) 
0-10  10-20  20-30  30+  0-10  10-20  2&30  30+  0-10  10-20  20-30  30+ 
Long-Run Changes in Taxes by 
Income Class ( x  S1,OOO) 
Savings unchanged 
Savings increase to 
maximum if 
saving > 0 
Savings increase to 
maximum if 
assets > 0 
Savings increase 
halfway to maxi- 








(&R=  O) 
(aR=  0.041) 
0  0  0  0  9  58  155  260  9  73  174  307 
44  2.5 1  353  267  16  110  2.52  371  12  99  223  362 
26  207  320  253  14  101  243  366  11  95  218  360 
22  126  177  134  13  84  204  319  11  86  199  336 
13  61  166  444  9  53  143  310  9  70  168  329 
2  6  41  112  7  43  11.5  194  8  65  154  272 
39  194  462  691  13  77  210  452  11  82  202  400 
Source:  Simulations based on 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey. 197  Alternative Tax  Rules and Personal Saving Incentives 
and interest. For anyone with interest and dividend income below the 
limit, the exclusion effectively eliminates the tax on such income at a 
margin and therefore has the full neutrality of  a consumption tax. 
The principal problem with the current exclusion is that the limit may 
be too low. For a couple with more than $400 of interest and dividends, 
the exclusion is intramarginal and has no effect on the taxation of  addi- 
tions to wealth. With today’s interest rates, a couple with as little as 
$4,000 of  wealth could easily find that the income from any additional 
saving would be fully taxed. This section considers alternative proposals 
to raise the limit on the exclusion. To reduce the cost of such an increase, 
we also consider two partial exclusion plans (the first plan excludes 20% 
of  all interest and dividend income while the second plan excludes one- 
half of the first $1,000 of interest and dividend income)M  and a plan with a 
floor (individuals with incomes in excess of  $10,000 can only exclude 
interest and dividend income to the extent that it exceeds 5%  of  the 
income over $10,000 and then only up to a limit of  $1,000). 
From the taxpayers’ point of view, the interest and dividend exclusion 
has two advantages over a savings deduction that implies the same real 
net rate of return. First, because the interest and dividend exclusion is not 
restricted to a separate account, there is no loss of liquidity to counterbal- 
ance the increase in yield. Second, there are no additional accounting or 
record-keeping requirements.  Both  of  these features suggest that, all 
other things being equal, individuals are likely to be more responsive to 
an exclusion than to a savings deduction. Against this might be balanced 
the “psychological” effect of the savings deductions in focusing attention 
on an immediate tax reward for saving. We know of  no evidence on the 
basis of  which this can be evaluated. 
The dividend and interest exclusion also has the advantage that there is 
no transition problem comparable to the transfer of  existing assets that 
ocurrs with a savings deduction. Of  course, the interest and dividend 
exclusion has an analogous problem since taxes are reduced immediately 
on the interest  and dividends earned on preexisting wealth.  But this 
problem  does not  just  apply during  the transition.  Rather, with  the 
interest and dividend exclusion, there is no real distinction between the 
initial  “transition”  tax  reductions  and the  subsequent  “steady state” 
reduction in taxes that result from assets that would have existed even 
without the exclusion. 
The principal issue in judging the potential usefulness of the interest 
and dividend exclusion is the amount of  additional saving that is gener- 
30.  Different combinations of  the “exclusion limit” and the “exclusion fraction” corre- 
spond to the same loss of tax revenue but have different incentive effects. The incentive 
effect depends on the distribution of existing wealth and on the sensitivity of saving to the 
net return. It would be interesting to use the information on the distribution of assets and 
alternative assumptions about the savings response to examine the implication of alterna- 
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ated per dollar of  foregone tax revenue. Of  course, there is no revenue 
loss directly caused by the increased accumulation of  wealth induced by 
the new tax rule. The interest and dividends that go untaxed would not 
have existed otherwise and therefore obviously would not have been 
taxed. All of  the revenue loss is due to the exclusion of  interest  and 
dividends or wealth that would have existed in any case.3’  This revenue 
loss therefore depends on the distribution of  existing interest and divi- 
dends, the limit on the exclusion, and the fraction that is excluded if there 
is  less than  a full exclusion. Section 6.3.1 presents evidence on this 
distribution. 
In evaluating the likely response to an interest and dividend exclusion, 
we give particular attention to those who currently have zero interest and 
dividends. As the data in section 6.2 on the distribution of gross financial 
assets implied, this is a very sizable group. Among taxpayers as a whole, 
46% had no interest and dividends. The concentration of  individuals at 
zero reflects a kink in the intertemporal budget constraint. Even in the 
absence of  taxes, the budget constraint would be kinked at the point of 
zero saving, reflecting the fact that the borrowing rate exceeds the rate 
that individuals receive on deposits. Since most taxpayers do not itemize 
their deductions, the tax rules leave the borrowing rate unchanged but 
reduce the net lending rate even more.” 
Because of  the kink, individuals with different preferences will have 
the same behavior. Because the reason that a particular individual has 
zero interest and dividends in equilibrium cannot be determined from the 
available data, the likely effect of  a tax change is ambiguous as well. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates this ambiguity in a two-period model of  income and 
consumption. In both parts of this figure, line ABCrepresents a constant 
interest rate budget line between current and future consumption. At 
point B, the individual neither borrows nor lends. The tax on interest 
income shifts the lending segment of  the budget constraint from BC to 
BE. The higher interest rate on borrowing than on lending shifts the 
borrowing segment from AB to DB. 
In figure 6.1~1,  the individual faced with the constant interest rate 
budget line ABC  would choose to save and therefore to consume at point 
X.  But with the kinked budget line DBE, the individual chooses point B 
with no borrowing and lending. In figure 6.lb, the individual faced with 
31.  At first, this seems to be in sharp contrast to the savings deduction plan where a 
deduction is given for induced saving as well as for the saving that would have occurred in 
any case. But the deduction itself is relevant only to the extent that the marginal tax rate of 
the saver exceeds his marginal tax rate when funds are withdrawn. Even when this is true, it 
is not a reason for preferring one plan over the other without knowing more about the 
response of individuals to this aspect since schemes with equal revenue loss could obviously 
be designed. 
32.  In 1972, all interest income was taxable.  Although  a $200 exclusion  applied  to 
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line ABC  would choose to borrow and therefore to consume at point Y. 
But with the kinked budget line DBE,  this individual also chooses point 
B. The exclusion of  interest and dividend income would raise the savings 
segment of  the budget line from BE  to BC. In figure 6.la,  this induces the 
individual to save and shifts the equilibrium from B to X;  in contrast, in 
figure 6.16 this has no effect on the individual’s behavior. Because we 
only observe that the individual is now at point B and cannot distinguish 
between the 6.1~  and 6.16 situations, the effect of  the tax change is 
ambiguous. 
We might in principle reduce the uncertainty by distinguishing between 
those individuals with zero interest and dividends who also borrow and 
those who do not. The borrowers are in equilibrium on segment BD and 
would not be influenced by a shift in the lending line from BE  to BC. The 
ambiguity would therefore  pertain only to those who were truly at point B 
with no borrowing as well as no lending. There are two difficulties with 
this line of  reasoning. The first is a practical one: information on borrow- 
ing is only available for itemizers and is therefore not available for the 
majority of  taxpayers and for an even larger share of  the group without 
interest and dividends since itemizing of deductions is relatively uncom- 
mon in this group. But even if  information on borrowing were available, 
there would be a problem since many individuals both borrow and lend. 
Since the borrowing is generally at a higher interest rate than the lending 
(typically consumer credit and savings accounts), the observed behavior 
reflects considerations of  liquidity and convenience and therefore cannot 
be reconciled with the simpler analysis of  figure 6.1. 
Since the prospective behavior of  those who currently have no interest 
or dividends is inherently ambiguous, we present simulations based on 
two alternative assumptions about this group. The first type of simulation 
makes the very conservative assumption that all individuals would prefer 
to be borrowing and therefore do not change their saving in response to 
an interest and dividend exclusion rule. The alternative sets of  simula- 
tions assume that all individuals respond by increasing their wealth to 
take at least some advantage of  the exclusion; no distinction is made 
between those who initially have interest and dividend income and those 
who do not. This behavior is consistent with figure 6.1~  (although with 
the individual switching from B to a point that may induce less saving than 
at X  if  the exclusion limit is binding).  Further information about the 
simulation method as well as the simulation results will be presented in 
section 6.3.2. 
6.3.1 
The current distribution of  interest and dividend income determines 
the tax revenue effects of various exclusion limits and the extent to  which 
changes in the limits can have marginal incentive effects. In considering 
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the data presented in this section, it is important to bear in mind that the 
1980 level of per capita income was approximately double the 1972 level 
and therefore that the typical taxpayer in 1980 had approximately twice 
the amount of financial assets. Moreover, the level of interest rates and 
the dividend-price ratio also doubled between  1972 and 1980. Thus a 
taxpayer who had $200 of  interest and dividends in 1972 probably had 
about $800 in 1980. 
Table 6.8 presents the cumulative frequency distribution of  interest 
and dividend income by AGI class. Note that 46% of  all taxpayers had no 
interest and dividend income and that an additional 25% had between $1 
and $200 of such income. Introducing a $200 exclusion would thus pro- 
vide an increase in the marginal real net interest rate for 71% of taxpayers 
while giving a tax reduction  with no marginal incentive effect to the 
remaining 29%. Extending the exclusion from $200 to $400 would add an 
additional 7% to the number of  taxpayers with a higher real net return 
and would double the intramarginal tax saving for the 22% of taxpayers 
with more than $400 of  interest and dividends. 
Since the vast majority of 1972 taxpayers had AGIs below $10,000, the 
overall pattern also describes the distribution of  interest and dividend 
income in that income class. The pattern is also similar among those with 
AGIs between  $10,000 and $20,000. Only in  the very small class of 
taxpayers  with higher incomes (less than  10% of  1972 taxpayers  had 
AGIs over $20,000) did  the interest and dividend distribution  differ 
substantially from this pattern. For example, among those with AGIs 
between $20,000 and $30,000 of  income, only 45% had less than $200 of 
interest and dividend income. For that income class, a $200 exclusion 
would be intramarginal for 55% of  taxpayers. 
Table 6.9 shows that the distribution of  interest and dividend income 
also differs substantially by age. While 71% of all taxpayers had less than 
or equal to $200 of interest and dividends, more than 90% of those less 
Table 6.8  Cumulative Distributions of Interest and 
Dividend Income by  Adjusted Gross Income Class 
Interest and 
Dividend 
Income  0-10  10-20  20-30  30+  All 
AGI Class ( x  $1,000) 
$0  58  37  16  5  46 
$200  77  70  45  18  71 
$400  82  80  59  26  78 
$800  87  87  73  40  85 
$1,600  91  93  82  54  90 
Source:  1972 Tax Model Data. 
Note:  Values shown are cumulative percentages of taxpayers with less than the indicated 
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Table 6.9  Cumulative Distributions of Interest 
and Dividend Income by Age Class 
Interest and  Age Class 
Dividend 
Income  22-29  30-49  5(M4  64+  All 
~  ~  ~~ 
$0  65  51  34  18  46 
$200  91  80  59  32  71 
$400  95  87  69  39  78 
$800  97  93  78  50  85 
$1,600  98  94  89  63  90 
Source: 1972 Tax Model. 
Note:  Values shown are cumulative percentages of  taxpayers with less than the indicated 
amount of  interest and dividend income. 
than twenty-nine years old and 80% of those aged thirty to forty-nine fell 
into this category. By contrast, only 32% of those over age sixty-four had 
as little as $200. These figures indicate that a $200 exclusion in 1972 would 
have had  a marginal incentive effect for a relatively large fraction of 
preretirement taxpayers  and that, for those older than sixty-five, the 
exclusion would be largely an intramarginal reward for earlier saving. 
6.3.2 
We now present the results of  simulations of  alternative exclusion 
rules. These simulations use the TAXSIM model for 1972; the baseline 
simulation  therefore  includes  a  $200  dividend  exclusion.  For  cost 
reasons, we have reduced the sample by a one-in-three selection, yielding 
a simulation sample of  8,881 taxpayers. 
The effect of  an exclusion rule on tax revenue depends only on the 
parameters of  the exclusion rule and not on the taxpayers’ behavioral 
response. This reflects the fact that no revenue is lost on the induced 
increase in  saving and the resulting increase in interest and dividend 
income. 
Because the exclusion rules refer to the income earned on the stock of 
financial assets and not to annual savings, we simulate the behavioral 
response in terms of  the stock of  financial assets (or “assets” for short). 
We estimate each taxpayer’s initial level of  assets by  assuming that the 
interest income reflects an interest rate of  4.5%  and that the dividend 
income reflects a dividend-price ratio of 3.0%. On this basis we estimate 
an initial average level of  gross financial assets of  $8,230 for each of  the 
77.5 million tax returns. 
Table 6.10 presents the simulated effects on tax revenue and on assets 
of the six exclusion plans: (1) exclusion of  the first $200 of  interest and 
dividend income; (2) exclusion of the first $400; (3) exclusion of the first 
$1,000; (4) exclusion of half of  the first $1,000; (5) exclusion of  interest 
Simulations of  Alternative Exclusion Rules Table 6.10  Simulated Effects of  Alternative Dividend and Interest Exclusions with 
Different Behavioral Responses: Mean Changes in Tax Revenues and Assets 
$l,OOO  Limit,  $l,oOO Limit  No Limit, 
$200 Limit  $400 Limit  $1,OOO  Limit  50% Exclusion  with Floor*  20% Exclusion 
1.  Decrease in tax revenue  $13  $21  $37  $19  $30  $34 
2.  Maximum response  $3,284  $7,122  $19,646  $19,646  $14,390 
3.  Halfway response  $1,642  $3,561  $9,823  $9,823  $7,195 
4.  Maximum response for those 
Increase in assets: 
with positive initial 
financial assets only  $727  $2,008  $6,861  $6,861  $4,639 
5.  Constant elasticity, q = 1  $98  $219  $546  $270  $369  $1,539 
6. Constant elasticity, q = 2  $191  $429  $1,089  $543  $733  $3,283 
Source: Simulations based on 1972 TAXSIM Data. 
*The floor restricts the interest and dividend exclusion to the excess of  interest and dividends over 5% of  their income over $lO,OOO. 204  Martin FeldsteidDaniel R. Feenberg 
and dividend income in excess of  a floor equal to 5%  of  income over 
$10,000 subject to a limit of  $1,000; and (6) exclusion of 20% of interest 
and dividend income without limit. These simulations are based on all 
taxpayers, including those over age sixty-five. The first row shows the 
effect of  each exclusion rule on the mean annual tax liability per taxpayer. 
Under the existing law, the mean 1972 tax liability was $1,247. Exclusion 
of the first $200 of interest as  well as dividends would reduce this by $13 to 
$1,234. This very small change in tax revenue reflects the fact that most 
taxpayers have much less than $200 of interest and dividends. With 77.5 
million tax returns, the reduction of $13 per return implies a total revenue 
loss of $1.0 billion. 
Increasing the exclusion from $200 to $400 reduces mean tax revenue 
by $8 per return; i.e. a doubling of the exclusion raises the revenue loss by 
about 60%. Similarly, raising the exclusion by 150% from $400 to $1,000 
only raises the revenue loss by about 75% or $16 per return. Limiting the 
exclusion to  50 percent of  the first $1,000 cuts the revenue loss in half; i.e. 
the total revenue loss with this rule is $19 per return or about the same as 
for a full exclusion of  the first $400 of  interest and dividends. Limiting the 
exclusion to the excess over a floor of 5 percent of  income over $10,000 
cuts the revenue loss from $37 to $30. Finally, the 20% exclusion without 
limit reduces tax revenue by $34 per return. 
Four types of behavioral responses are simulated. The first assumes 
that each taxpayer increases his assets enough to take full advantage of 
the exclusion. Thus for the $200 exclusion each taxpayer accumulates a 
total of  $4,445 of  assets since we  assume  an interest  rate of  4.5%. 
Although the average initial value of assets is $8,230 the distribution of 
these assets  is  such  that most  taxpayers have  substantially  less  than 
$4,000; as table 6.8 indicated, 71% of  taxpayers had less than $200 of 
interest and dividends. The first number in the second row of  table 6.10 
indicates that the average increase in assets if  each taxpayer accumulated 
enough to take advantage of  the full $200 exclusion would be $3,284. 
The second simulation reduces the full response in an arbitrary way by 
assuming that everyone moves half way from his existing assets to the full 
$4,445. Thus someone who currently has $3,000 of  assets increases them 
by $772. This response is of  course equivalent to assuming that half of the 
taxpayers do not respond at all while half respond fully, or to any other 
distribution of  individual responses that averages a half-way response. 
The third simulation makes the very conservative assumption that all 
those taxpayers with no dividend and interest income in 1972 would not 
respond at all to the exclusion. All other taxpayers increase their assets to 
take full advantage of the exclusion. The result, shown in the third row of 
table 6.10, is an increase in mean assets of  $727. 
The  final simulation also begins with the conservative assumption that 
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assets. Moreover, those with a relatively small initial amount of  assets are 
assumed to show a correspondingly small increase in wealth. In particu- 
lar, we assume that their behavior is governed by a constant elasticity 
response of assets to  the relative “costs” of  present and future consump- 
tion. 
where A. is the actual assets with the existing law, A,  is the assets with the 
exclusion, and Ro and R2  are the rates of transformation with the current 
and  alternative  tax  rules.  With  an  exclusion  but  no  deduction, 
R2 = (1 +  i -  T)=  an, as before, Ro = (1 + (1 -  O)i -  IT)=;  for any indi- 
vidual whose interest and dividend income already exceeds the exclusion, 
R2 = R,, and there is no change in assets. We are fully aware that this is a 
very rough model of behavior that does not capture the life-cycle charac- 
ter of  the induced  change  in  consumption  and  that quite arbitrarily 
assumes that all those who currently have no assets are either myopic or 
would prefer to be net borrowers even if  there were no tax on interest 
income. We nevertheless illustrate this constant elasticity asset response 
by simulating with two alternative values: II = 1  and q = 2. A unit elastic- 
ity implies, for example, that an individual with a marginal tax rate of 
20% and initial assets of  $2,000 would increase her assets by $692; an 
elasticity of  2 would imply an increase of  $1,623. The results of these 
simulations are shown in  rows 5  and 6. With  a $200 limit  and a unit 
elasticity of  response, the average increase in assets would be $98; an 
elasticity of 2 implies a mean asset increase of  $191. 
Although the results for the other exclusion limits in table 6.10 are 
self-explanatory, three comments are worth making. Note first that in- 
creasing the exclusion limit raises the potential accumulation by more 
than a proportionate amount even though the revenue effect rises less 
than proportionately. Second, the floor reduces the revenue cost of  a 
$1,000 limit exclusion by $7 or somewhat less than 20%. In contrast, the 
increase in assets in every behavioral simulation fell by a greater percent- 
age.  Third, the 20% exclusion has by far the largest behavioral effect both 
absolutely and per dollar of  revenue loss. 
It is clear from the wide range of  possible responses that we have 
recorded in table 6.10 that our uncertainty about the effect of  a dividend 
and interest exclusion is very substantial. The 1980 legislation, introduc- 
ing a $400 interest and dividend exclusion, will provide a natural experi- 
ment from which we can hope to learn more about the nature of  the 
individual savings response.  Of  course, the evidence on even the first 
year’s experience  will not be available in usable form until about 1984  and 
policymakers may want to make decisions about savings incentives be- 
fore then. It is perhaps reassuring therefore that the simulations reported 206  Martin Feldstein/Daniel R. Feenberg 
in table 6.10 indicate that the alternative exclusion plans involve quite 
little revenue loss. Moreover, even these revenue loss figures overstate 
the net impact of  an interest and dividend exclusion to the extent that the 
additional capital is invested in the corporate sector and results in in- 
creased corporate tax revenue. 
6.4  Conclusion 
The public’s increased awareness of  the low rate of personal saving in 
the United States and of the high effective tax rate on the income from 
personal saving has generated a growing interest in changing the indi- 
vidual income tax rules to stimulate saving. Although there are many 
specific plans, there are two principal options: (1) deductions from tax- 
able income for savings deposited in special accounts where interest then 
accrues untaxed until the funds are withdrawn and (2) the exclusion of 
interest and dividends from taxable income. The revenue loss that would 
result from such deductions or  exclusions can be limited by restrictions on 
the maximum amount of the deduction or exclusion or by allowing only a 
partial deduction or exclusion. The problem with  any such ceiling or 
floor, however, is that it may eliminate marginal incentives (for those 
with savings or investment income above the ceiling or well below the 
floor) or severely restrict the size of the incentive effect (for those who are 
near the ceiling). The desirability of any saving plan depends critically on 
its  ability  to limit  the revenue  loss  without  destroying  the marginal 
incentives. 
Analyzing the effects of limits and floors requires microeconomic data 
on savings, financial assets, and interest and dividend income. The pres- 
ent paper uses such data from individual tax returns and from the Con- 
sumer Expenditure Survey to estimate the potential effects of alternative 
tax rules. Because the likely response of households to new tax rules is 
not known, we present simulations for a variety of  different behavioral 
assumptions. 
Although  the savings deduction and the interest exclusion  are fun- 
damentally very similar, they are likely to have quite different effects 
during a rather long period of  transition because they treat active savers 
very differently from those who previously saved and are currently dis- 
saving. Moreover, potential savers may be influenced by  the liquidity 
differences between  the two methods or by  the appearance that the 
immediate deduction confers a greater benefit. Because individuals differ 
in their situations and perceptions, a combination of both plans might be 
more effective in raising saving than an equal-cost reliance on either plan 
alone. The paper therefore presents separate analyses of  the two types of 
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The evidence that we present is not adequate for choosing the best 
combination of these options or even for deciding whether either option 
should be chosen. We do not have sufficient information about savings 
behavior to predict the response of capital accumulation to these plans. 
Moreover, the design of  an approximate tax policy involves not only the 
savings response but more general aspects of  excess burden and the fair 
distribution of  the tax burden. 
But the analyses in this paper are sufficient to demonstrate that some of 
the potential problems that have been raised as objections to the savings 
proposals are not  very  serious.  First,  although  some of  any savings 
deduction would merely reward saving that would have occurred in any 
case, even with a deduction limited to 10% of wages and salaries (with a 
ceiling of $2,000) there would be very few savers for whom the incentive 
was intramarginal. Similarly, at 1972 levels of wealth and interest rates, a 
$400 exclusion of interest and dividends would provide a marginal incen- 
tive for more than 75% of  taxpayers. 
The second basic fact that emerges in our study is that the reduction in 
tax revenue caused by an exclusion or deduction plan would be relatively 
modest. With the exclusion plans, the revenue loss does not depend on 
the taxpayers’ response to the changed incentive. In 1972, a $400 interest 
and dividend exclusion would have entailed a revenue loss of only $21 per 
taxpayer, or an aggregate of  less than $2 billion. Increases in the $400 
limit involve substantially less than proportionate increases in the reve- 
nue loss. The revenue effect of  a savings deduction plan does depend on 
the reaction of  savers to the new incentive. Although some preexisting 
assets would be transferred into the special accounts in the years im- 
mediately after a savings deduction plan was introduced, the potential 
transfer amounts and associated revenue loss are relatively small for the 
vast majority of  taxpayers. After the transition period, if  there were no 
increase in saving, a deduction limited to 10% of  wage income (with a 
ceiling of  $2,000) would entail a revenue loss at 1972 levels of  only $4 
billion.33  Any actual increase in saving that is induced by  the deduction 
would then substantially exceed the associated loss of  tax revenue.34 
33.  This short-run revenue loss is based on the existing savings distribution and excludes 
asset  transfers;  see section 6.2.1 for evidence on the  modest one-time  revenue cost of 
allowing deductions for asset transfers. The corresponding long-run revenue loss, which 
also reflects both the loss of  the subsequent tax revenues that would have been collected on 
the interest and dividends on these savings and the gain in tax revenue that would eventually 
be collected when the funds are withdrawn, would be about $5 billion. 
34.  Recall that if the revenue loss on this additional saving is measured by the immediate 
consequence of  the deduction, an extra dollar of  saving reduces tax revenue by only about 
20 cents. This tax reduction is partially recovered (in a present value sense) to the extent that 
the individual’s tax  rate is as high when  the funds are withdrawn.  Although no tax  is 
collected on the interest and dividends earned on the extra capital, this is not a revenue loss 
since  it  would  not  otherwise  have  existed.  Indeed,  the  corporate income  tax  on  this 
additional capital could more than offset the loss in personal tax revenue. 208  Martin Feldstein /Daniel R. Feenberg 
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Comment  Martin J. Bailey 
The paper “Alternative Tax Rules and Personal Saving Incentives,” by 
Martin  Feldstein  and Daniel  R. Feenberg, correctly  emphasizes  the 
advantages of  a comprehensive reform of  the taxation of  income from 
capital, and correctly remarks on the political imperatives that force a 
piecemeal approach in its place. The quantum leap of  a major Pareto 
improvement in this area is unmistakably out of reach, whereas the time 
is ripe for third-best proposals such as integrations of  corporate and 
personal  income  taxes  and the limited  exclusions  considered  in  this 
paper. Pragmatically, therefore, the paper is a necessary, valuable exer- 
cise. If read with the proper care  and selectivity, the results are useful and 
are superior to the corresponding estimates produced by the Treasury 
Department and by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation. 
The estimates can be further improved and narrowed down by better 
methods. Hence my comments imply restrained enthusiasm for the re- 
sults as given: I regret that the authors failed to use all the analytical tools 
they had at their command. The principal tools they neglected are neatly 
summarized in the following quote from their paper: “The effect on 
savings of  a [reduction] in the taxation of  capital income therefore de- 
pends on the timing of  tax payments and on the response of government 
Martin J. Bailey is with the Department of  Economics, University of  Maryland. 210  Martin FeldsteidDaniel R. Feenberg 
spending. If  government spending in  each  year  remains  unchanged, 
national saving must rise. If the compensating changes in the tax keep tax 
liabilities in each year unchanged, private saving must also increase.” 
These propositions, now well established, were derived from the theory 
of household maximization subject to budget constraint, a theory regret- 
tably neglected in the balance of  the paper. Also omitted was the com- 
pensated tax change, whose use would have obviated discussion of  the 
controversy about the Ricardian equivalence theorem and with the re- 
lated and highly debatable income effects. Without these complications 
the only possible outcome is a fall in consumption, and the range of cases 
to be considered would be markedly reduced. 
Also, sampling error can be considerably reduced in tax simulations by 
nonrandom sampling from the Treasury’s public use sample of individual 
tax returns, taking all due care to avoid bias in the selection criteria. 
Throughout the paper, purchases of  financial assets are considered 
equivalent to savings, subject to only  slight caveat. The authors do 
explain that taxpayers with eligible assets would use up a savings exclu- 
sion for several years by  transferring these assets into the special tax- 
privileged accounts. They also argue that taxpayers would be deterred by 
the inconvenience from converting an ineligible asset, such as the home, 
into eligible form by borrowing against it (e.g. by  increasing the mort- 
gage.) However, there is no appreciable inconvenience in using the net 
proceeds of  a new, larger mortgage to buy eligible assets and then to 
transfer them year by  year into the special account. Similarly, an in- 
creased dividend exclusion would doubtless induce more corporations to 
specialize in high dividend-payout ratios. Responses like these will re- 
duce and could even nullify the predicted national savings (or consump- 
tion) responses. 
The reader will note that this comment on taxpayer responses involving 
no new saving increases the chance of  a zero consumption effect, in 
contrast to my earlier comment suggesting that consumption must de- 
cline. Thus the criticisms partly offset each other. However, the fact 
remains that for compensated tax changes the case of  a consumption 
increase cannot occur (apart from asymmetrical distributional effects). A 
zero  consumption  change  would  be  the  extreme  case  among  the 
possibilities. 
Careful analysis of  taxpayer responses to tax changes is the needed 
next improvement in the estimation of  revenue effects-a  step that has 
been in development in various studies for  some time. It is only beginning 
to affect official estimates, although that picture has lately changed from 
one extreme to the other in the flamboyant appearance of  “supply-side” 
ideas and claims. The Feldstein and Feenberg paper is a constructive 
attempt to improve the picture. 